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SOVEREIGNTY, IDENTITY,  AND THE 
‘APPARATUS OF DEATH’ 
TAWIA ANSAH* 
In February 2002, a new statute came into force in Rwanda. The 
statute embodied a new national unity doctrine essentially erasing ethnic 
division.1 Under the new law, “[i]t is not just considered bad form to 
discuss ethnicity in the new Rwanda. It can land one in jail. Added to the 
penal code is the crime of ‘divisionism,’ a nebulous offense that includes 
speaking too provocatively about ethnicity.”2 In short, in the new Rwanda, 
by force of law,3 “[t]here is no ethnicity here. We are all Rwandan.”4 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, New England School of Law. LL. B., University of 
Toronto Faculty of Law; Ph. D., Columbia University. Professor Ansah teaches 
Contracts, Public International Law, International Business Transactions, and Legal 
Theory. The author wishes to thank Lawrence M. Friedman, Peter Manus, and Judy 
Greenberg for reading earlier versions of this article. He also wishes to thank Dan 
D’Isidoro and Spencer Jenkins for editorial assistance. 
 1. Law No. 47/2001 of 18/12/2001 Instituting Punishment for Offences of 
Discrimination [translation of the French “divisionnisme” or “amacakubiri” in 
Kinyarwanda] and Sectarianism. Article 8 reads: “any person who makes public any 
speech, writing, pictures, images or symbols over radio airwaves, television, in a 
meeting or public place, with the aim of discriminating people or sowing sectarianism 
among them is sentenced to between one year and five years of imprisonment [. . .].” 
Discrimination and sectarianism are defined in broad terms in Article 3: 
 The crime of discrimination occurs when the author makes use of any 
speech, written statement or action based on ethnicity, region or country 
of origin, color of the skin, physical features, sex, language, religion or 
ideas with the aim of denying one or a group of persons their human 
rights provided by Rwandan law and International Conventions to 
which Rwanda is party. The crime of sectarianism occurs when the 
author makes use of any speech, written statement or action that causes 
an uprising and that may degenerate into strife among people. 
  Id.  
 2. Marc Lacey, A Decade After Massacres, Rwanda Outlaws Ethnicity, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 9, 2004, at A3. 
 3. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND: OVERVIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
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Meanwhile, at around the same time, the Rwandan government’s 
quarrel with its erstwhile revolutionary brothers-in-arms in neighboring 
Uganda boiled over into a cross-border war on the terrain of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the conflict there grew to 
include several other nations in what some have described as the 
continent’s first inter-African war.5 The justification for these wars was in 
part, as one nongovernmental organization (NGO) described it, “playing 
the ethnic card.”6 
 
ISSUES IN RWANDA, (Jan. 1, 2004), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/12/31/ 
rwanda7009.htm. In the section entitled, “The 2003 Constitution Gives and Takes 
Away,” Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports: 
The June 2003 Constitution guarantees freedom of association, 
assembly, opinion, and press but also subjects these freedoms to 
ordinary legislation, making it possible for legislators to limit them and 
making it impossible for courts to defend them on constitutional 
grounds (article 34). Still suffering the consequences of the 1994 
genocide, Rwandans understandably seek to end the ethnic hatreds and 
discriminatory behavior that preceded attempts to eliminate the Tutsi 
minority. But the Constitution goes too far in prohibiting ‘divisionism’ 
in overly broad and vague terms (article 33). 
  Id. 
 4. Lacey, supra note 2, at A3 (quoting Ernest Twahrwa reciting Rwanda’s official view 
toward ethnicity); see also Michael C. Dorf, Can Ethnic Hatred be Eliminated by 
Eliminating Ethnicity? (Apr. 14, 2004), http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/ 
dorf/20040414.html (noting that the new law “aims to eliminate distinctions between 
the groups entirely”). Dorf adds: “Two key features of Rwanda’s effort to stamp out 
ethnicity would be highly problematic in stable democracies: first, Rwanda is creating 
re-education camps where people are trained in the ‘correct’ way to think of their 
fellow citizens; second, Rwanda will prosecute those guilty of a vague crime called 
‘divisionism.’” Id. 
 5. See Gérard Prunier, Congo-Kinshasa: The First Inter-African War, AFR. 
GEOPOLITICS, Winter 2001, available at http://www.african-geopolitics.org/ 
show.aspx?ArticleId=3056. 
Since August 2, 1998 the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has 
been bogged down in a dispute in which the armies of Namibia, Angola 
and Zimbabwe, allies of the Kinshasa regime, have fought those of 
Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda which are against it. Other than these 
regular armies, a good dozen armed renegade factions have fought on 
one side or the other, with a great variety of political goals which gives 
the alliances an uncertain and fluctuating character. Not even regular 
armies always have a clear strategy. Although theoretical allies, Rwanda 
and Uganda have clashed three times in the Congo since August 1999. 
  Id. 
 6. Rwanda Monitoring Project, Opening Statement: Report 2003, (Feb. 2003), 
http://dusabane.org/Rwanda%20Report_Opening%20statement.pdf. In the section 
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There seems to be an evident paradox: the law is deployed to 
eradicate, i.e. violently erase, ethnie (ethnic identity) through training 
camps and self-censorship7, even as ethnie functions as a justification for 
violent conflict outside the borders, indeed, projecting military force as 
legal violence on the basis of humanitarian aims (a “just war”). But on 
closer examination, the paradox becomes more explicable. First, of course, 
the outlines of the story can be reduced and simplified to the paradoxical 
play of ethnie between inner and outer manifestations of sovereign 
violence, but any story is more complex than its outline, and Rwanda is no 
exception. For instance, at the moment of Rwanda’s independence from 
Belgium, and thus the accession to modern sovereignty, there was more 
going on than simply the violent overthrow of an old colonial power. The 
fury of independence was fueled as much by a hatred of the Belgians as of 
the Tutsi power elite; indeed, the Belgians were despised despite switching 
their allegiance, at the last minute, from the Tutsi leaders to the Hutu Power 
revolutionaries. The war of independence thus formed a nexus with a war 
of revolution (the triumph of the Hutu Power movement) and a war of 
extirpation, marked by the mass slaughter and cleansing of the Tutsi in 
1959 and throughout the 1960s and 1970s.8 
The 1994 genocide was thus the culmination of a long and complex 
history of rule, counter-rule, and revolution. No wonder the inheritor 
government, after the genocide, had to navigate a miasma of legal, political 
and moral quandaries, each decision freighted with memory. If anything, 
the paradoxical role of ethnie—its centrality as justificatory narrative 
 
entitled, “Benchmark 1 Conflict Resolution:” “In 2003 Rwanda has delivered arms, 
training and other forms of military support to different militia and local players in the 
DRC, including in Ituri, North and South Kivu. . . . In North Kivu, Rwanda seems to 
be doing this by playing the ethnic card.” Id. The Project consists of several NGOs. 
 7. Id. (“The possible accusation of divisionism leads to self-censorship.”). 
 8. CBC News Online, Indepth: Rwanda, (Aug. 22, 2003), http://www.cbc.ca/news/ 
background/rwanda/history.html. 
Belgium ruled [from 1890] indirectly through the Rwandan king and, in 
1935, introduced mandatory identification cards to Rwandans: those in 
possession of 10 or more cows were classified as Batutsi, or Tutsi; those 
with fewer were called Bahutu, or Hutu. The king and the Belgians 
favoured the more affluent Batutsi and installed them as vassals in 
charge of governing the regions of Rwanda. Unsatisfied with the 
balance of power, the Hutu called for more representation in 
government. When King Mutara III died in 1959 and his Tutsi 
successor, Kigeri V, was appointed, the Hutus revolted and violence 
erupted. 
  Id. For a general history, see also, GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY 
OF A GENOCIDE (1995); and PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT 
TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES (1998). 
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before and during the genocide, its fraught relation to justice and 
reconciliation afterwards (the attempt to eradicate it at least in part, or 
symbolic of, the attempt to erase the memory of Tutsi monarchical 
rulership)—highlights the inherent difficulty of relating the legitimacy9 of 
sovereign power to law, and furthermore, the relation between law and 
violence. 
The question posed in this essay, then, is whether, using the Rwanda 
story in its outlines as an example, there is a relation between the legal 
elision of ethnic identity within, and the juridical deployment of ethnic 
identity to legitimize wars without. In short, what is the relationship, post-
conflict, between law, sovereign legitimacy, and violence as refracted 
through the lens of identity? 
One might begin with at least two premises regarding the relation 
between law and violence: first, that the relationship is aberrant, whereupon 
sovereignty is legitimized by the defeat, erasure, and absence of violence; 
and second, that the sovereign’s legitimacy vests somehow within the 
enmeshment of law and violence. The first view is discussed by Paul Kahn 
as the law’s self-identity, against which view he issues a caution: “Of 
course, from within the culture of law violence is labeled aberrational. But 
this self-characterization cannot be taken at face value . . . .”10 Indeed, 
under a cultural study of law, “the [individual] violent act does not appear 
‘senseless,’ but filled with meaning. Violence is one point at which the 
body is forced to bear a meaning.”11 
Kahn’s discussion of individual acts of violence that yield meaning 
within the law—indeed, give rise to law—makes intuitive sense, and can be 
extended to a discussion not only of individual but also of sovereign 
violence and the meanings created under, through or within law. One can, 
in other words, think of sovereign power as the (legitimate) exercise of the 
 
 9. For a critical view of the government, see Rwanda Monitoring Project supra note 6. 
“The consequences of this election year [2003] reach very far since the current 
government has lost, rather than won, legitimacy for many years to come.” Id. 
 10. PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
93-94 (1999). 
 11. Id. at 95. Kahn goes on to describe this violence within the law as the violence 
directed by individuals inter se: 
Violence under law is not the consequence of a physical object moving 
in space, with which we may accidentally collide. It is the physical 
presence of a subject coercing others for the sake of some idea of self 
and other; it is resisted through a counter-act of coercion that invests 
those same bodies with an alternative meaning. The cultural approach 
places violence under law within a structure of understanding that 
focuses on the intersection of the physical body and the abstract idea. 
  Id. 
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confluence, and the production of meaning, between violence and law, 
particularly within the context of a massively violent atrocity and the 
attempt to suture the wound of fractured identity through 
erasure/eradication. 
In other words, what does it mean that sovereign power in Rwanda is 
“legitimized” by the erasure of ethnie, the alleged core of meaning borne 
by the body before and during the genocide? What is the link between 
dyadic or binary (Tutsi-Hutu) identity’s self-negation (sovereign as I-am-
not) and the violent pursuit of the enemy “out there,” beyond the border? 
In this brief essay I will outline a modern theory of sovereignty and 
relate it to the sovereign in Rwanda after the conflict in 1994. I wish to see 
how sovereign power plays out within the question of legal identity in the 
aftermath of violence and pursuant to the violence of the law as, so to 
speak, a test case for the modern theory on sovereignty. This is not to deny 
that a modern sovereign may wage wars for any number of political or 
moral reasons. Rather, I’m interested in looking specifically at the juridical 
dimension of sovereign power and its relation to identity and violence and 
to ask whether this relation is inevitable, or whether there are alternative 
ways of imagining the nexus. 
I. BARE LIFE 
In the Rwandan Constitution, self-identity is based on the elision of 
dyadic identity, that is, identity premised on the hierarchical, and therefore 
conflictual, bipolarity of self and other, Hutu and Tutsi.12 The new model 
identifies a third way as the latency of each pole: Rwandan self as neutral 
and, although materially specific (geography, history, etc.) emptied of the 
kinds of identity markers or indexes that would create or perpetuate a 
hierarchy. But such a “presence” is dependent upon what is elided and 
absent; such ipseity is inevitably a suppression of alterity at a deep register. 
Nevertheless, its promise is one of stability and salvation, the salve that 
would quiet the tension within, and perhaps—it remains a question—would 
lend further validity to the projection of violence without: the enemy is he 
who perpetrates violence on the basis of identity, he who remains caught up 
in the dyad; he who is, in this sense, other. 
Rwanda’s external wars, however, are conducted not according to the 
new law, for the sovereign speaks outside the nation within the moment of 
the suspension of the law of ethnie-erasure; the sovereign speaks the 
language of ethnie for the protection and security of the self as post-
 
 12. The Twa form a third (minority) ethnic group in Rwanda. The Twa tend to live apart, 
and are already elided from much of the discourse on ethnie. Thus, part of the success 
of the government’s objective in eradicating ethnie altogether is to eradicate binarity, 
and to enclose all groups within the monolithic identity of “Rwandan.” 
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identity, post-dyad. Without in any way wishing to suggest a moral 
equivalence, it may nonetheless be noted that the extension of this space 
within which the sovereign attacks the outside other (other sovereign 
states) within the void of law resembles, qua a state of emergency,13 the 
suspension of law that enabled the genocide within the borders by the 
precursor state, ten years before. The present government pursues its own 
claim to sovereign legitimacy on the basis of combating those forces of 
genocide that continue to threaten the state’s security by, in effect, 
extending the state of emergency temporally and spatially (within and 
across the borders). Thus, the erasure of identity, or the construction of 
identity (albeit premised on a negation), is perhaps the supreme act of the 
sovereign as such. The act necessitates the state of exception for its 
exercise and its legitimacy. 
But what is the state of exception, and how has it been theorized as 
the condition precedent to sovereign power’s legitimacy? This leads to a 
brief discussion of the debate amongst the theorists, after which I will 
return to the story of Rwanda and ask whether, or how, the theory 
elucidates the Rwandan story, and the latter in turn critiques the theory, as 
both theory and story (experience) project a similar promise, beyond law’s 
violence and beyond dyadic, hierarchical identity, for a respite from the 
burden of memory. 
The short answer to the question on the meaning of “exception” is 
that it is within the state of exception that the sovereign “decides” what is 
law and what is not. It is also within the state of exception that sovereign 
power creates something called “bare life” (understood, at its simplest, as 
life stripped of all but the nakedness of existence14); that is, it is here that 
 
 13. See, e.g., Giorgio Agamben, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Verona, 
Lecture at the Centre Roland-Barthes (Universite Paris VII, Denis-Diderot) on “The 
State of Emergency,” http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpagambenschmitt.htm (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2005). 
The state of emergency defines a regime of the law within which the 
norm is valid but cannot be applied (since it has no force), and where 
acts that do not have the value of law acquire the force of law. This 
means, ultimately, that the force of law fluctuates as an indeterminate 
element that can be claimed both by the authority of the State or by a 
revolutionary organization. The state of emergency is an anomic space 
in which what is at stake is a force of law without law. Such a force of 
law is indeed a mystical element, or rather a fiction by means of which 
the law attempts to make anomy a part of itself. 
  Id. 
 14. Bare life is situated at the border between humanity and non-humanity, however that 
border is conceived. For a literary representation of life stripped bare, one might 
consider King Lear’s lines as he looks upon the wretched Edgar, hiding near a cave 
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the relation between sovereign power and real life becomes most evident, 
revealing how power shapes and moulds lives, or how human lives are the 
bearers of the meaning and consequences of power. The intriguing question 
will be whether, when the African sovereign strips identity of ethnie, this 
act is (a) part of a generalized or global extension of the state of 
emergency, whence the fusion of rule and exception; (b) specific to the 
sovereign as victim of atrocity in a justificatory deployment and 
legitimization of sovereign power and violence; or (c) an alternative model 
of sovereignty (sovereign as I-am-not) to that submitted by the legal 
theorists (sovereign hegemony as creating bare life), each seeking a 
different kind of salvation from memory. At stake is the potential for 
Rwanda to tell us something about the nature of modern sovereignty as 
such, something like a critique of the Western model through which the 
African sovereign has been conceptualized as having, always and already, 
been “transformed” by a Western politico-juridical gaze into bare life.15 
II. THE EXCEPTION 
The theoretical discussion around sovereignty begins with Walter 
Benjamin’s famous essay, “Critique of Violence.”16 In this essay, Benjamin 
shows how there are two kinds of violence, or ways in which violence is 
related to law: one that is the source of law, the other that maintains it: 
 
on the open heath; Lear might also be talking about himself: 
Is man no more than this? Consider him well. Thou ow’st the worm no 
silk, the beast no hide, the sheep no wool, the cat no perfume. Ha! 
Here’s three on’s are sophisticated; thou art the thing itself. 
Unaccommodated man is no more but such a poor, bare, forked animal 
as thou art . . . . 
  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 3, sc. 4. 
 15. Cf. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE, 180 (Daniel 
Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1998) (1995). 
And in a different yet analogous way [to that of Nazi Germany, which 
had to “infinitely purify” the population “through the elimination of the 
mentally ill and the bearers of hereditary diseases”], today’s 
democratico-capitalist project of eliminating the poor classes through 
development not only reproduces within itself the people that is 
excluded but also transforms the entire population of the Third World 
into bare life. 
  Id. My point will be that this may be true in substance, but its articulation as 
“transformation” perpetuates an age-old attenuation of agency or subjectivity on the 
part of the Third World sovereign. 
 16. Walter Benjamin, Critique of Violence in REFLECTIONS: ESSAYS, APHORISMS, 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITINGS 300 (Peter Demetz ed., Edmund Jephcott trans., 
Schoken Books 1978). 
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“The law of this oscillation [between the violence that posits law and the 
violence that preserves it] rests on the fact that all law-preserving violence, 
in its duration, indirectly weakens the lawmaking violence represented by 
it, through the suppression of hostile counterviolence.”17 This oscillation, 
Benjamin suggests, is all that would be evident of the relationship between 
violence and the law. He cautions, therefore, that “[a] gaze directed only at 
what is close at hand can at most perceive a dialectical rising and falling in 
the lawmaking and law-preserving formulations of violence.”18 What needs 
to happen, he suggests, is “the breaking of this cycle maintained by 
mythical forms of law,” whereupon “a new historical epoch is founded.”19 
The break or interruptive force (violence) sits outside of law and is 
not implicated in the formation or preservation of law. However, as the 
Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben notes of this passage, “[t]he 
definition of this third figure, which Benjamin calls ‘divine violence,’ 
constitutes the central problem of every interpretation of the essay.”20 It has 
led to much confusion, some suggesting that Benjamin was predicting 
Auschwitz, avant la lettre, as an instance of divine or pure violence.21 
Benjamin and Agamben are at pains to note that divine violence cannot be 
given content; on the contrary, such would no longer be able to break the 
cycle of sovereign violence. Divine violence, however, may be thought of 
as the perch from which to see how legal violence actually operates within 
the legitimization of sovereign power; divine violence is able to show how 
the object of sovereign power—bare life—is created by sovereign violence. 
 
 17. AGAMBEN, supra note 15, at 63 (alteration in original) (quoting from Walter 
Benjamin’s essay, the “Critique of Violence,” supra note 16). 
 18. Benjamin, supra note 16, at 300. 
 19. Id. Agamben quotes the same passage as follows: “In the interruption of this cycle, 
which is maintained by mythical forms of law, in the deposition of law and all the 
forces on which it depends (as they depend on it) and, therefore, finally in the 
deposition of State power, a new historical epoch is founded.” AGAMBEN, supra note 
15, at 63. 
 20. AGAMBEN, supra note 15, at 63. 
 21. See, e.g., Anselm Haverkamp, Anagramatics of Violence: The Benjaminian Ground 
of Homo Sacer, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 995, 1000 (2005). 
He [Agamben] identifies it [divine violence as a ‘deposition’ or 
Entsetzung] not as the the [sic] pre-performative, reflexively oriented, 
(de-) divination (Ver-göttlichung) of the transcendentalized or 
transcendentalizeable order of violence, but as the annunciation of 
‘something new’ in this place—a place that has been the site of 
annihilating over-simplifications (enough of which are still hanging 
around, ever since the attempt was made to declare Benjamin’s 
‘Critique’ to be a prophecy of Auschwitz). 
  Id. 
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As such, divine violence is disaggregated from sovereign power, and its 
sheer existence engenders “something new,” for bare life as the object and 
the objective of sovereign power within the exception is “laid bare.”22 
Agamben suggests that the most famous theory or articulation of 
sovereign power as inhering within the exception—that of Carl Schmitt—is 
in fact a response, or more exactly a rebuttal, to Benjamin’s posit of divine 
violence. Thus, by looking at how the two theories are interrelated—
Schmitt and Benjamin—Agamben is able to show how each element—
sovereign violence, divine violence, and bare life—relates to the other. 
First, Schmitt discounts the possibility of divine violence: all violence 
inheres within the law, either as law’s rule or as the suspension of law 
within the exception. Second, Schmitt’s definition of the sovereign as “he 
who decides on the exception”23 means, according to Agamben, that even 
as “[s]overeign violence opens a zone of indistinction between law and 
nature, outside and inside, violence and law,” 24 nevertheless 
the sovereign is precisely the one who maintains the possibility 
of deciding on the two to the very degree that he renders them 
indistinguishable from each other. As long as the state of 
exception is distinguished from the normal case, the dialectic 
between the violence that posits law and the violence that 
preserves it is not truly broken, and the sovereign decision even 
appears simply as the medium in which the passage from the one 
to the other takes place.25 
Thus, it is in fact sovereign violence that “posits law, since it affirms that 
an otherwise forbidden act is permitted, and . . . conserves law, since the 
content of the new law is only the conservation of the old one.”26 
Agamben then notes that, “[t]he violence that Benjamin defines as 
divine is instead situated in a zone in which it is no longer possible to 
distinguish between exception and rule. It stands in the same relation to 
sovereign violence as the state of actual exception . . . does to the state of 
virtual exception.”27 Divine violence, so to speak, is necessitated by the 
zone of indistinction where, as Agamben notes elsewhere, nomos and 
anomie are fused, law disappears, and “there is only a zone of anomy 
dominated by pure violence with no legal cover.”28 This is the logical 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY, 5 (George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (1922). 
 24. AGAMBEN, supra note 15, at 64. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 65. 
 28. Agamben, supra note 13. 
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consequence of Schmitt’s collapse of all violence within the purview of 
law, and it is within this relation between violence and law that “the status 
of violence [is] a cipher for political action.”29 There is, when rule and 
exception are indistinguishable, no difference between violence and 
politics. 
The point about naming this clarifying, exterior (to law) violence 
“pure” or “divine” is the attempt, at least in part, to strip it of mythological 
content and to distinguish it from violence that “generate[s] myths in its 
wake—which in the end ‘bastardizes pure divine violence and law.’”30 
Pursuant to such legal violence, “[b]lood brings to expression the mythical 
compulsion toward the representation of violence’s manifestation in law, a 
law in which ‘the human being’ is collapsed ‘with bare human life’—
something which is for Benjamin to be avoided ‘at all costs.’”31 That is, 
where there is no difference between politics and violence, human life is 
increasingly diminished, engendering a politics of passivity and 
acquiescence. 
Not only does divine violence disclose the effects of sovereign 
violence as productive of bare (reduced) life, whose figuration is essential 
for understanding the link between law and violence, but the posit of divine 
violence is an attempt to engender the “dissolution of juridical violence” by 
purifying “‘the guilty, not of guilt, however, but of law.’”32  In other words, 
the project of divine violence is one of purification—of myth, fiction, 
illusion—and a confrontation with the real: the actual exception rather than 
virtual exception (the latter being Schmitt’s invention to cauterize the posit 
or threat of an exteriority to law’s domain). The apprehension of an actual 
exception will engender a politics distinct from violence. 
The virtual exception is marked by the conflation of rule and 
exception, wherein violence is the norm. If there is an actual exception, 
disaggregated from the possibility of sovereign decision, then there is the 
posit or possibility of an outside, a zone of adjudication, and an escape, 
from the oscillating, normative violence and the endless dying. But this 
very posit, i.e., divine violence that “‘de-poses’ (entsetzt)”33 sovereign 
violence, is only possible within the presence of sovereign violence, and 
only possible as the projected negation of that sovereign violence and, by 
implication, the sovereign as he who decides on the exception, and can thus 
legitimately conflate or disaggregate nomos and anomie. 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Haverkamp, supra note 21, at 1001 (quoting Jacques Derrida). 
 31. Id. at 1002-03 (quoting Walter Benjamin). 
 32. AGAMBEN, supra note 15, at 65 (quoting from Walter Benjamin’s essay, “Critique of 
Violence,” supra note 18). 
 33. Id. at 64. 
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The paradox deepens further. Divine violence is in fact an absence or 
a negation: it does not exist except, on the one hand, as the desacralized 
revelatory marks upon the bare, reduced human body, as testimony to the 
inhumanity of sovereign violence. And on the other hand, it is pure 
otherness, always and already conceived as pure futurity. In a sense—and 
this brings me back to Rwanda and the sovereign as I-am-not—divine 
violence, I would argue, especially in its denial and repudiation of sacrality, 
is a form of apophatic desire.34 That is, the eros underwriting the posit (de-
position) of divine violence, to the extent that it distinguishes between the 
divine other and the non-divine other, its ethical agency or project is 
disaggregative: despite the impossibility of giving content as such to this 
form of violence, its very existence as interventionist requires that it posit a 
limit case. Divine violence is pure, empty; sovereign violence and its limit 
case are immanent, perceptible only by this juxtaposition against purity: 
“The [concentration] camp, which is now securely lodged within the city’s 
interior, is the new biopolitical nomos of the planet.”35 
CONCLUSION 
The elision of identity for the Rwandan sovereign is similarly marked 
by the spillage, across borders, of the nomos as excess, the eclipse of 
memory within the formality of a constitution, the I-am-not as the limit 
case and the anomie of the I-am. On the one hand, it is as if the sovereign 
played out the fate of the Muselmann in the camps: “Mute and absolutely 
alone, he has passed into another world without memory and without grief. 
For him, Hölderlin’s statement that ‘at the extreme limit of pain, nothing 
remains but the conditions of time and space’ holds to the letter.”36 On the 
other hand, the sovereign’s I-am-not is the acclimation of a kind of 
divinity, the very opposite of, and the mirror to, the figuration of bare life. 
Here, too, memory is evaded, silenced, and lost. 
In the result, it is as if the posit of purity—of the elision of law, of 
absence, or of violence extrinsic to sovereign legitimacy—as the 
redemptive promise of rupturing the oscillating forms of legal violence 
played out in the exception as a meld of nomos and anomy, brings with it 
not myth, fantasy or mysticism, but, more potently perhaps, desire (eros) 
for purity: from guilt and, as Benjamin notes, from the law itself. 
What to make of this in the context of Rwanda’s apophatic sovereign? 
 
 34. See generally Owen Ware, Impossible Passions: Derrida and Negative Theology, 
PHIL. TODAY (Soc’y for Applied Phil., London, U.K.), Summer 2005, at 171. 
Apophatic is defined as “of knowledge of God: obtained through negation.” OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 95 (New Shorter Ed. 1993). 
 35. AGAMBEN, supra note 15, at 176. 
 36. Id. at 185. 
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Agamben might say that the mere reinsertion of a sacral element 
(apophasis) has already given content to divine violence and thus 
bastardized it; for divine violence must needs be void of content and pure, 
existing as such in dyadic relation both to sovereign violence and to law. 
Like the Sirens, the purity of divine violence tempts one, by its silence and 
indifference,37 toward the mystical imaginary.38 
Nevertheless, I conclude with a question about the possibility that 
there may be a relationship, or an intimation (indeed, an intimacy), between 
the Rwandan negation of ethnie (purified “I,” like the desire for pure being) 
and the quest for pure violence as exterior to nomos, whether imagined or 
conceptualized as revolution (Marcuse39), or love (Kahn40), or as “the 
ultimate stake of the political” (Agamben41). If there is indeed an intimacy, 
then the question becomes whether the quest for purity, no less than its 
opposite, the fantasy of mystical fusion, will make good on its promise of 
an escape—into politics—from the oscillating indeterminacy of law and 
violence; an escape, ultimately, from the “apparatus of death.”42 
 
 
 37. There is a story, or perhaps it is a joke or riddle, that the Sirens were silent as they 
watched Odysseus and his men sail by. They wondered idly, for a moment, why 
Odysseus, strapped to the mast of his ship, looked so agonized and rapturous. They 
thought him rather handsome, then turned and went about their business as the ship 
sailed on. 
 38. See AGAMBEN, supra note 15, at 63-64. “Benjamin in fact offers no positive criterion 
for its [i.e. divine violence’s] identification and even denies the possibility of 
recognizing it in the concrete case . . . . Hence its capacity to lend itself to the most 
dangerous equivocations . . . .” Id. 
 39. See, e.g., Haverkamp, supra note 21, at 1000. 
 40. KAHN, supra note 10, at 100. 
 41. Agamben, supra note 13. 
To pure being as the ultimate stake of metaphysics, corresponds pure 
violence as the ultimate stake of the political; to the onto-theological 
strategy that wants pure being within the net of logos, corresponds the 
strategy of exception that has to secure the relation between violence 
and law. It is as if law and logos would need an anomic or “a-logic” 
zone of suspension in order to found their relation to life. 
  Id. 
 42. Id. 
